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Abstract
Cooperation is a persistent behavioral pattern of entities pooling
and sharing resources. Its ubiquity in nature poses a conundrum.
Whenever two entities cooperate, one must willingly relinquish some-
thing of value to the other. Why is this apparent altruism favored in
evolution? Classical solutions assume a net fitness gain in a cooper-
ative transaction which, through reciprocity or relatedness, finds its
way back from recipient to donor. We seek the source of this fitness
gain. Our analysis rests on the insight that evolutionary processes are
typically multiplicative and noisy. Fluctuations have a net negative
effect on the long-time growth rate of resources but no effect on the
growth rate of their expectation value. This is an example of non-
ergodicity. By reducing the amplitude of fluctuations, pooling and
sharing increases the long-time growth rate for cooperating entities,
meaning that cooperators outgrow similar non-cooperators. We iden-
tify this increase in growth rate as the net fitness gain, consistent with
the concept of geometric mean fitness in the biological literature. This
constitutes a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.
Its minimal assumptions make it a candidate explanation of cooper-
ation in settings too simple for other fitness gains, such as emergent
function and specialization, to be probable. One such example is the
transition from single cells to early multicellular life.
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1 Introduction
They give that they may live, for to withhold is to perish.
K. Gibran
Nowak (2006, p. 1563) concludes his review of the mechanisms of cooper-
ation with the words: “Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of evolution is its
ability to generate cooperation in a competitive world.” Indeed, life is full of
cooperative structure. We living beings exist not as minimal self-reproducing
chemical units, but as cells, organisms, families, herds, companies, institu-
tions, nations, and so on. Cooperation – the persistent behavioral pattern of
entities pooling and sharing their resources – is ubiquitous in nature.
This ubiquity is puzzling because pooling and sharing seem prima facie to
involve altruism. The temporarily better-off entity in a cooperating pair must
willingly relinquish something of value to the worse-off entity to maintain
the cooperative pact. If naked altruism is an unsatisfactory explanation of
evolved behavior, then we must elucidate the benefit derived by the better-off
entity in such an arrangement.
Classical explanations involve two ideas. The first is that a cooperation
benefit exists between two entities. Specifically, the fitness gain of the re-
cipient exceeds the fitness cost to the donor. The second is that, over time,
this net increase in fitness finds its way back to the donor. This can happen
through reciprocity, where past donors become future recipients, or through
relatedness, where the recipient carries genetic material that the donor is
interested in propagating. Nowak (2006) offers a comprehensive account
of this approach, delineating five cooperative arrangements possible when
a cooperation benefit exists, and five corresponding conditions under which
cooperation is favored in evolution.
Our aim here is to postulate a mechanism through which this coopera-
tion benefit, or net fitness gain, arises. This is important because classical
analyses are predicated on its existence.
We start from the basic model of a living entity as something which self-
reproduces with temporal fluctuations. Treating biomass as a multiplica-
tive stochastic process yields two exponential growth rates: that achieved in
the long-time limit, on which fluctuations have a negative effect; and that
achieved in the many-entities limit, unaffected by fluctuations. This is a
manifestation of non-ergodicity.
We hypothesize that repeated pooling and sharing is beneficial because,
by reducing the net effect of fluctuations, it increases the long-time growth
rate at which cooperating entities self-reproduce. Cooperation is observed in
nature because those who do it outgrow those who don’t. We identify this
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increase in the growth rate of biomass with the net fitness gain of classical
treatments.
Fitness has many definitions in the biological literature (Orr, 2009). While
commonly agreed to refer to the ability of living organisms to survive and
reproduce, no precise definition of it has achieved consensus. Of all the defi-
nitions proposed, our work relates most closely to geometric mean fitness, on
which the effects of fluctuations are recognized (Lewontin and Cohen, 1969;
Gillespie, 1977; Orr, 2009). To avoid confusion, we speak here of growth
rates rather than fitness, since they are defined unequivocally. Among enti-
ties undergoing noisy multiplicative growth, that whose time-average growth
rate is highest will, over time, come to dominate its environment.
Motivating this study is a particular evolutionary phenomenon: the tran-
sition to multicellularity. This occurs when a species of non-cooperating
single cells mutates to a species of multicellular organisms, sharing nutrients
through common membranes. Often this is explained by a different type of
fitness gain: the emergence of new function. An agglomeration of cells may,
for example, develop the ability to swim up a nutrient gradient or funnel
resources towards itself (Short et al., 2006; Roper et al., 2013). Implicit in
such explanations is a degree of complexity not present in early unicellular
life. The performance of specialized tasks requires many cells to be assem-
bled in delicate designs, whose spontaneous development would be extremely
improbable. To be a credible theory, evolution must explain not only the rich
tapestry of cooperative structure we observe now, but also early cooperative
steps, such as from single cell to cell pair, where new function cannot be relied
upon. A universal mechanism for the evolutionary advantage of cooperation
is needed.
We present our work as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce a simple math-
ematical model of noisy multiplicative growth and summarize its relevant
properties. In Sec. 3 we describe a cooperation protocol in which entities
grow, pool, and share biomass. In Sec. 4 we show that, under certain condi-
tions, entities which cooperate increase the time-average growth rate of their
biomass. This, we hypothesize, is a universal explanation of the existence
of cooperation. In Sec. 5 we discuss generalizations of our model. We offer
concluding remarks in Sec. 6.
2 Noisy multiplicative growth
Let xi(t) represent the biomass of an entity i at time t. Biomass generates
more of itself. For example, a cell collects nutrients and other matter, then
splits into two cells, which split into four cells, and so on. This happens
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stochastically. Some entities thrive, perhaps in safe and plentiful environ-
ments, while others have their growth hampered, sometimes terminally.
While we speak typically of the biomass of an entity, our analysis is
agnostic to replacement of ‘biomass’ by ‘population,’ ‘resources,’ ‘wealth,’
and the like; and of ‘entity’ by ‘cell,’ ‘organism,’ ‘colony,’ ‘herd,’ ‘society,’
and so on. Cooperation in nature occurs in many domains and at many
scales.
A common and general model of noisy self-reproduction is geometric
Brownian motion. In simple terms, the change in biomass over a short time
step is a normally distributed random multiple of the existing biomass. More
formally, xi(t) follows the Itoˆ drift-diffusion process,
dxi = xi(µdt+ σdWi), (1)
where µ is the drift and σ is the volatility. The dWi are independent and
identically-distributed random increments of the Wiener process, which are
normal with zero mean and variance dt.
Geometric Brownian motion is a universal model because it is an attractor
for more complex models that exhibit multiplicative growth (Aitchison and
Brown, 1957; Redner, 1990). It is a model of unconstrained growth. Self-
reproduction limited by resource or space constraints or by predation would
be poorly described by (Eq. 1). The water lily of the famous riddle, recounted
in (Meadows et al., 1972), stops growing exponentially once it covers the
pond.
Over time T , each biomass experiences a random exponential growth rate,
defined as
g(xi, T ) ≡ 1
T
ln
(
xi(T )
xi(0)
)
. (2)
Imagine starting many cell cultures in separate petri dishes and watching
their biomasses evolve according to (Eq. 1) for time T . Assume the dishes
are large enough and T short enough that growth does not slow for want of
agar. The observed exponential growth rates would be drawn from a normal
distribution with mean µ− σ2/2 and variance σ2/T :
g(xi, T ) ∼ N
(
µ− σ
2
2
,
σ2
T
)
. (3)
The expectation value or ensemble average of the biomass is defined as
〈x〉 ≡ lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi. (4)
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Its evolution is computed by noting that (Eq. 1) implies d 〈x〉 = µ 〈x〉 dt.
This describes exponential growth of 〈x〉 at a rate equal to the drift. We will
call this the ensemble-average growth rate and denote it by
g(〈x〉) = µ. (5)
The physical meaning of this quantity is worth making explicit. It is the
growth rate of the large-sample limit of mean biomass. Since (Eq. 1) is not
an ergodic process, this observable is a priori uninformative of the temporal
behavior of a given trajectory. We don’t mean by this the trivial observation
that individual trajectories are stochastic, while their expectation value is
not. Rather, there are two fundamentally different ways of removing stochas-
ticity from (Eq. 2): we may compute (Eq. 5); or we may consider a single
long trajectory, and let time remove randomness from the growth rate.
If only a single system is to be modeled, then (Eq. 5) is, in essence, fiction:
the expectation value is an average over imagined parallel universes, where
the randomness in (Eq. 1) plays out in all its different possible ways.
One might guess that the growth rate observed in an individual trajectory
will converge to (Eq. 5) over time, but that is simply a common conceptual
error. Instead, the non-ergodicity of (Eq. 1) manifests itself such that the
growth rate observed in a single trajectory converges to a different value,
which we call the time-average growth rate. This is the almost sure limit of
(Eq. 3) as T →∞,
g¯(xi) ≡ lim
T→∞
g(xi, T ) = µ− σ
2
2
. (6)
We note that g¯(xi) = 〈g(xi, T )〉, meaning that g(xi, T ) is an ergodic observ-
able (specifically, one whose expectation value reflects what happens over
time in a single trajectory) for the non-ergodic process of noisy multiplica-
tive growth (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016).
We see in nature what has survived. In our model, the entity with
the highest time-average growth rate will, regardless of its ensemble-average
growth rate, come to dominate the biomass in the system over time. The ra-
tio of its biomass to that of other entities will grow exponentially. Strategies
which maximize g¯(xi), and not necessarily g(〈x〉), will confer an evolution-
ary advantage on their adherents. For any entity, g¯(xi) is less than g(〈x〉)
by the fluctuation-sensitive term σ2/2. This standard result of Itoˆ calculus
(van Kampen, 1992, Ch. 5) has found its way into the biological literature
(Gillespie, 1977, Eq. 1). It suggests that strategies which reduce volatility
should be favored in evolution and observed in nature.
The inequality of the ensemble-average and time-average growth rates
in geometric Brownian motion, discussed in (Peters and Gell-Mann, 2016;
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Adamou and Peters, 2016) in the context of economics, is known by evolu-
tionary biologists. A clear description is found in (Lande, 2007, p. 1836). The
difference is often labelled as that between arithmetic and geometric mean
growth rates (Lewontin and Cohen, 1969) or between arithmetic and geomet-
ric mean fitnesses (Orr, 2009). The positive effect of volatility reduction on
geometric mean fitness is also recognized, as noted in (Gillespie, 1977) and
(Orr, 2009, Box 3). It is precisely this effect in the context of cooperation
that we explore here.
3 Cooperation protocol
Having established these properties of (Eq. 1), we now introduce our model
of cooperation. Our reference point is a population of N non-cooperating
entities, such as single-celled organisms, whose biomasses follow geometric
Brownian motions with identical drift and volatility but with independent
realizations of the noise. In other words, (Eq. 1) with i = 1 . . . N .
Consider a discretized version of (Eq. 1), such as would be used in a
numerical simulation. The non-cooperators grow according to
∆xi(t) = xi(t)
(
µ∆t+ σξi
√
∆t
)
, (7)
xi(t+ ∆t) = xi(t) + ∆xi(t), (8)
where ξi are independent standard normal variates, ξi ∼ N (0, 1).
The cooperation mechanism, summarized pictorially for N = 2 in Fig. 1,
is as follows. We imagine a mutation that hard-wires cooperation into the
entities. Think, for example, of a mutation that causes cells to agglomerate
by sharing their membranes. Previously independent entities with biomasses
xi(t) now find themselves cooperating. We label their biomasses yi(t) to
distinguish them from the equivalent non-cooperators. For simplicity we
assume equal sharing, yi(t) = y
(N)(t) for all i, where y(N)(t) denotes the
per-entity biomass for N equal cooperators.
In the discrete-time picture, each time step involves a two-phase process.
First there is a growth phase, analogous to (Eq. 7), in which each cooperator
increases its resources by
∆yi(t) = yi(t)
(
µ∆t+ σξi
√
∆t
)
. (9)
This is followed by a cooperation phase, replacing (Eq. 8), in which resources
are pooled and shared equally among the cooperators,
yi(t+ ∆t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi(t) + ∆yi(t)) = yi(t) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆yi(t), (10)
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Figure 1: Cooperation dynamics. Cooperators start each time step with equal re-
sources, then they grow independently according to (Eq. 5), then they cooperate by
pooling resources and sharing them equally, then the next time step begins.
Consider a discretized version of (Eq. 1), such as would be used in a numerical
simulation. The non-cooperators grow according to
 xi(t) = xi(t)
h
µ t+  
p
 t ⇠i
i
, (2)
xi(t+ t) = xi(t) + xi(t), (3)
where ⇠i are standard normal random variates, ⇠i ⇠ N (0, 1).
Cooperation works as follows. We imagine that the two previously non-cooperating
entities, with resources x1(t) and x2(t), cooperate to produce two entities, whose re-
sources we label y1(t) and y2(t) to distinguish them from the non-cooperating case.
We envisage equal sharing of resources, y1 = y2, and introduce a cooperation operator,
 , such that
x1   x2 = y1 + y2. (4)
In the discrete-time picture, each time step involves a two-phase process. First
there is a growth phase, analogous to (Eq. 2), in which each cooperator increases its
resources by
 yi(t) = yi(t)
h
µ t+  
p
 t ⇠i
i
. (5)
This is followed by a cooperation phase, replacing (Eq. 3), in which resources are
pooled and shared equally among the cooperators:
yi(t+ t) =
y1(t) + y1(t) + y2(t) + y2(t)
2
. (6)
With this prescription both cooperators and their sum experience the following
dynamic:
(x1   x2)(t+ t) = (x1   x2)(t)

1 +
✓
µ t+  
p
 t
⇠1 + ⇠2
2
◆ 
. (7)
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Figure 1: Cooperation dynamics. Two cooperators start each time step with
equal resources. Then they grow independently according to (Eq. 9). Then
they cooperate by pooling resources and s ring them equally, according to
(Eq. 10). Then the next time step begins.
where the second equality follows from the equality of the yi(t). This is
equivalent to equal sharing of the total of the individual fluctuations,
∆y(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆yi(t). (11)
Cooperation has no direct cost in this protocol. In reality, pooling and
sharing often require a coordinating mechanism. For example, large organ-
isms have circulatory systems to redistribute nutrients, and human societies
have administrative systems to redistribute resources. It is possible for such
mechanisms to have costs that make otherwise beneficial cooperation unvi-
able. We do not expect our model to describe well situations where such
effects are important. Equally, we ascribe no direct benefit to cooperation.
In our basic setup, costs and benefits emerge as the effects of cooperation on
time-average growth rates.
Substituting (Eq. 9) into (Eq. 11) yields the dynamic followed by the
biomasses of each cooperator,
∆y(N)(t) = y(N)(t)
(
µ∆t+
σ
N
N∑
i=1
ξi
√
∆t
)
. (12)
Sums of independent normal variates are normal. We define a standard
normal variate,
ξ(N) ≡ 1√
N
N∑
i=1
ξi ∼ N (0, 1), (13)
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which allows us to rewrite (Eq. 12) as
∆y(N)(t) = y(N)(t)
(
µ∆t+
σ√
N
ξ(N)
√
∆t
)
. (14)
Thus the net effect of N individual fluctuations with pooling and equal shar-
ing is a single equivalent fluctuation, whose amplitude is 1/
√
N times that of
the individual fluctuations. Substituting into (Eq. 12) and letting the time
increment ∆t → 0, we recover a stochastic differential equation of the same
form as (Eq. 1), but with the volatility reduced from σ to σ/
√
N :
dy(N) = y(N)
(
µdt+
σ√
N
dW (N)
)
. (15)
4 Analysis and solution of the cooperation
puzzle
The expectation values of the biomasses of a non-cooperator, 〈x1(t)〉, and
the corresponding cooperator, 〈y1(t)〉, with the same initial biomass, x1(0),
are identical: x1(0) exp(µt). From this perspective there is no incentive for
cooperation. Moreover, immediately after the growth phase, (Eq. 9), the
better-off entity in a cooperating pair, say y1(0) > y2(0), could increase its
future expectation value from [(y1(0) + y2(0))/2] exp(µt) to y1(0) exp(µt) by
breaking the cooperative pact. Analyzing the growth of the expectation value
gives no reason for cooperation to arise and, if it does arise, good reasons for
it to end. From this perspective, cooperation looks fragile and its frequent
observation in nature seems puzzling.
The solution of the puzzle comes from changing perspectives and consider-
ing the time-average growth rate instead of the ensemble-average growth rate.
We know from (Eq. 6) that non-cooperating entities grow at g¯(xi) = µ−σ2/2
over long time. The analogous growth rate for the cooperative dynamic,
(Eq. 15), is found by changing σ to σ/
√
N in (Eq. 6) to get
g¯
(
y(N)
)
= µ− σ
2
2N
. (16)
For any non-zero volatility, cooperators have faster time-average growth rates
than non-cooperators. The premium increases with the number of coopera-
tors as 1− 1/N ,
g¯
(
y(N)
)− g¯(xi) = σ2
2
(
1− 1
N
)
, (17)
implying that larger cooperatives are favored over smaller ones.
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From the perspective of our model, we see that cooperators will eventually
dominate the environment and that cooperation will become ubiquitous. The
effect is illustrated in Fig. 2 by direct simulation of (Eq. 7)–(Eq. 8) and
(Eq. 12). Notice the nature of the Monte Carlo simulation in Fig. 2. No
ensemble is constructed. Only individual trajectories are simulated and run
for a time that is long enough for statistically significant features to emerge
from the noise. This method teases out of the dynamics what happens over
time.
Simulating an ensemble and averaging over members to remove noise
is a different process which tells a different story. Features emerging from
the noise when averaging over an ensemble do not, in general, also emerge
over time. From (Eq. 16) we see that the time-average growth rate of a
cooperator approaches the expectation-value growth rate of a non-cooperator
(or, indeed, that of a member of a finite cooperative) only as the number of
cooperators grows large,
lim
N→∞
g¯
(
y(N)
)
= µ. (18)
The pink dashed line in Fig. 2 plots the temporal evolution of the expectation
value of the biomass of a non-cooperator, which bears little resemblance to
that of the biomasses of individual non-cooperators (green) and members of
small cooperatives (blue).
5 Generalizations of the model
5.1 Idiosyncratic entities
Real cooperatives have members of differing abilities as well as differing for-
tunes. The latter we model already as different realizations of the noise in
(Eq. 1). The former we can treat by generalizing (Eq. 1) so that the entities
have idiosyncratic drifts and volatilities,
dxi = xi(µidt+ σidWi), (19)
for i = 1 . . . N . Some entities will have higher individual time-average growth
rates than others. This raises questions. Does it benefit leaders to share with
laggards? When should a non-cooperator join a cooperating group? When
should the group allow it?
Repeating the analysis of growth, pooling, and sharing yields a modified
9
Figure 2: Typical trajectories for two non-cooperating (green) entities and
for the corresponding cooperating unit (blue) on a logarithmic vertical scale.
Over time, the noise reduction for the cooperator leads to faster growth.
Even without effects of specialization or the emergence of new function, co-
operation pays in the long run. The thin black line shows the average of the
non-cooperating entities, which is far inferior to the cooperating unit. In a
very literal mathematical sense the whole, y1(t)+y2(t), is more than the sum
of its parts, x1(t) + x2(t). The algebra of cooperation is not merely that of
summation. The expectation-value growth rate (at which the pink dashed
line grows) is the growth rate in the limit of infinitely many cooperators.
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dynamic,
∆y(N)(t) = y(N)(t)
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
µi∆t+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σiξi
√
∆t
)
= y(N)(t)
(
µ(N)∆t+ σ(N)ξ(N)
√
∆t
)
. (20)
ξ(N) is a standard normal variate, as before, and
µ(N) ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
µi, σ
(N) ≡ 1
N
√√√√ N∑
i=1
σ2i (21)
are effective drift and volatility parameters. Therefore, the biomasses of the
cooperators evolve according to
dy(N) = y(N)
(
µ(N)dt+ σ(N)dW (N)
)
, (22)
with time-average growth rate,
g¯
(
y(N)
)
= µ(N) − (σ
(N))2
2
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
µi − σ
2
i
2N
)
. (23)
This is the sample mean of the time-average growth rates each entity would
achieve by cooperating with like entities, c.f. (Eq. 16).
We can now answer the questions. It benefits entity j to join the cooper-
ative if g¯
(
y(N)
)
> g¯(xj), i.e. if
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
µi − σ
2
i
2N
)
> µj −
σ2j
2
. (24)
Similarly, the cooperative benefits by admitting entity j if
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
µi − σ
2
i
2N
)
>
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
(
µi − σ
2
i
2(N − 1)
)
. (25)
Consider two entities, where µ1 > µ2 and σ1 < σ2 so that x1 grows faster
over time than x2. Rearranging (Eq. 24) for N = 2, we see that the fast
grower should share with the slow grower if µ1 − 3σ21/4 < µ2 − σ22/4.
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5.2 Correlated fluctuations
A second generalization concerns correlations. Fluctuations experienced by
different entities are uncorrelated in our model: the dWi in (Eq. 1) and,
consequently, the ξi in (Eq. 7) onwards are independent random variables.
In reality, cooperators are often spatially localized and experience similar
environmental conditions. By allowing correlations between the ξi, our model
can be adapted to describe such situations.
Suppose the ξi ∼ N (0, 1) realized in a given time step are jointly normal
and cross-correlated such that 〈ξiξj〉 = ρij. Assume for simplicity that
ρij =
{
1, i = j,
ρ, i 6= j, (26)
i.e. that the fluctuations for all pairs of different entities have the same
covariance, ρ, where |ρ| ≤ 1. The more general case of a covariance matrix
with unequal off-diagonal elements is also tractable, but adds complexity
without illumination.
The presence of cross-correlations alters the evaluation of the sum of the
normal variates in (Eq. 12). We have now
N∑
i=1
ξi ∼ N (0, N +N(N − 1)ρ). (27)
Positive variance requires ρ to be confined to −1/(N − 1) ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Equa-
tion (27) suggests defining, analogously to (Eq. 13), a standard normal vari-
ate,
ξ(N) ≡ 1√
N +N(N − 1)ρ
N∑
i=1
ξi ∼ N (0, 1), (28)
such that the change in y(N) can be written as
∆y(N)(t) = y(N)(t)
(
µ∆t+ σ
√
1 + (N − 1)ρ
N
ξ(N)
√
∆t
)
, (29)
analogous to (Eq. 14) in the uncorrelated case.
Without correlations, cooperation reduces the amplitude of fluctuations
from σ to σ/
√
N . With them, the fluctuation amplitude becomes
σρ ≡ σ
√
1 + (N − 1)ρ
N
. (30)
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The variation of σρ with ρ and N delineates the main features of this gen-
eralized model. Firstly, as a consistency check, we note that σρ → σ/
√
N
as ρ → 0 for fixed N , recovering the uncorrelated result in the appropriate
limit.
For all N > 1, we have 0 ≤ σρ ≤ σ, with σρ = σ if and only if ρ = 1. In
other words, provided fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, a cooperation
benefit always exists. This makes intuitive sense. With perfect correlation,
all the ξi are identical and pooling and sharing achieves nothing. The co-
operative is equivalent to a giant individual following a single trajectory of
(Eq. 1). As soon as some variation is introduced between the fluctuations of
the entities, the cooperation mechanism can begin to mitigate the negative
effects of fluctuations on growth.
Furthermore, we have σρ → σ√ρ as N →∞, with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 in this limit.
The maximum time-average growth rate achievable by adding cooperators is,
therefore,
lim
N→∞
g¯
(
y(N)
)
= µ− σ
2ρ
2
, (31)
c.f. (Eq. 18). This cannot exceed µ (since ρ is non-negative) and decreases as
ρ increases. Again, this is consistent with intuition: as fluctuations become
more correlated, the variation between them diminishes and the scope for
beneficial cooperation narrows. In our setup, cooperation relies on diversity
in individual outcomes.
5.3 Partial cooperation
Another generalization of our model is to partial cooperation. Here entities
pool and share only a fraction of their resources, resembling, for example,
taxation and redistribution in human societies. We discuss this in a separate
manuscript (Berman et al., 2017).
6 Discussion
Our model assumes nothing more than that evolutionary processes are mul-
tiplicative and noisy. In this context, the evolutionary advantage of coop-
eration arises from the nonlinear dependence of growth rates on temporal
fluctuations. By reducing the amplitude of fluctuations, pooling and sharing
increase the time-average growth rate of cooperating entities. This paints a
picture of cooperation driven by self-interest, not altruism, with cooperators
outgrowing similar non-cooperators.
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Where our model describes well the growth of things in nature, it predicts
that cooperation will be prevalent. As an attractor for many processes whose
relative changes are independent random variables, we expect the model to
resemble many real examples of self-reproduction.
In reality, many effects contribute to the formation of cooperative struc-
ture. Members of large cooperatives can coordinate their actions to develop
emergent functions, such as the ability to swim towards nutrients. Cells in
multicellular organisms differentiate and specialize in particular tasks. Hu-
man cooperation works analogously, with firms and individuals becoming
proficient in different roles.
By finding a cooperative benefit under minimal assumptions, our analysis
may shed light on cases of cooperation without such effects. In particular, it
may explain the transition from single cells to bicellular organisms, too small
and simple to benefit from new function or specialization.
Classical treatments of cooperation are predicated on the existence of
a net fitness gain in a donor-recipient interaction. A universal mechanism
by which this benefit arises would strengthen their theoretical foundations.
In our model of noisy self-reproduction, we identify the increase in time-
average growth rate achieved through cooperation as this net fitness gain.
This is consistent with the concept of geometric mean fitness in the biological
literature.
The impact of risk reduction on long-time growth suggests that risk man-
agement has a rarely recognized significance. Fluctuation reduction, or good
risk management, does not merely reduce the likelihood of disaster or the
size of up and down swings. It also improves the long-time performance of
the structure whose risks are being managed. While the effect of reducing
fluctuations depends on the specific setup, it is tantalizing to see that the
simple and universal setting of multiplicative growth favors structure in the
form of large cooperative units.
The insight that time averages may not be identical to expectation values
was only reached in the development of statistical mechanics in the 19th
century, where the physical nature of expectation values was identified as
the mean over an ensemble of non-interacting systems. The development of
ergodic theory in the 20th and 21st centuries provided the concepts that reveal
the physically relevant aspect of stochastic processes like (Eq. 1). Today we
have at our disposal mathematical tools that allow us to understand nonlinear
dynamical effects, such as described here. Applying these tools suggests that
our natural tendency to cooperate – manifested in our gut feeling and moral
sentiment – is in harmony with a careful formal analysis of the issues involved.
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